No Deal: Why Ukraine Should Not be Pressured to Make Peace with Russia

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ZACH FOTIADIS: As we pass the 1-year anniversary of the war in Ukraine, signs of fatigue are becoming increasingly apparent. Statesmen like Henry Kissinger have called for Ukraine to make territorial concessions to Russia in exchange for peace. The Republican House majority in the 118th Congress remains divided over military aid to Ukraine, with many members viewing it as U.S. involvement in yet another unnecessary foreign entanglement. International leaders ranging from Brazil’s Lula to Germany’s Scholtz have suggested that Zelensky and Putin set aside their differences and negotiate a potential settlement. 

As enticing as the idea of two warring states pursuing peace may seem, peace simply for peace’s sake is not necessarily a virtue. One must understand what is at stake and consider whether diplomacy will in fact maximize international security and prosperity in the long-term. Considering the historical and geopolitical context surrounding the Russian invasion of Ukraine, exerting pressure on President Zelensky to accept Putin’s demands would be a grave mistake. 

If Ukraine elects to enter bilateral negotiations with the Kremlin, the West should by no means stand in their way. But Kiev is not particularly keen to do so at the moment, for good reason. 

For one thing, such diplomatic efforts have consistently failed in the past. Throughout the early period of the conflict, Zelensky had been more than generous in his overtures to Moscow, going so far as to concede future membership in NATO and the EU in exchange for Russian withdrawal last March. It was Putin who shut down these talks, issuing unreasonable demands ranging from unilateral Ukrainian demilitarization to permanent Russian occupation of the Donbas. 

Even prior to the conflict, Zelensky took a relatively passive stance toward Russian troop mobilization along the Ukrainian border, a position which may have very well enticed Putin to invade in the first place. 

It is important to recall why Putin decided to pursue military action. Underneath the facade of “denazification” and “NATO expansion” lie his true motivations: irredentist imperialism and jingoistic bravado. While it is impossible to know exactly what goes on in the man’s head, Putin’s strongman leadership style appears to be an attempted throwback to the Russian glory days of its status as a great power. Putin views the collapse of the Soviet Union as a tragedy of world history, not because of the fall of communism but rather its ushering in a period of political decadence for the Russian state. 

The Russian Federation has been a declining power for decades, no longer among the top ten global economies and relying almost exclusively on crude petroleum exports as its sole commercial enterprise. It is an effectively landlocked country, despite having the world’s largest coastline. Its only consolation is the fact that it narrowly retains the largest nuclear arsenal of any nation. The annexation of Russian-speaking territory in neighboring Ukraine boils down to a desperate attempt on the part of Tsar Vladimir to reassert Moscow’s geopolitical dominance. 

Ukraine has little incentive at this stage to legitimize the Napoleonic fantasies of a revisionist autocrat who longs for the days of the Russian Empire and likens himself to Peter the Great. Zelensky has made clear since the beginning his opposition to ceding an inch of his country’s land to Russia. 

This is the heart of the conflict. NATO extension to the Kremlin’s doorstep is a non-issue here. If it were, Putin would have already declared victory, accepting a formal concession from Zelensky to forgo future accession into the Western military alliance and maintain Kiev firmly within his sphere of influence. 

Denazification is little more than a red herring; Ukraine’s far-right militia culture has historically remained isolated to the political fringe, unlike in Russia’s additional non-NATO neighbor and close ally, Belarus. While certainly a problem, Ukrainian neo-Nazism is arguably more concentrated among the very same Russian-speaking populations of the Donbas Putin is ostensibly protecting from proto-Fascism. 

Comparisons between Putin and Hitler are certainly hyperbolic. However, launching what is effectively a blitzkrieg into a neighboring country for the purposes of restoring ethnic solidarity and exercising military bravado exhibits some considerable parallelism to the origins of the Second World War. The Munich Analogy has an exhaustive history of overuse, but this is a clear instance where it fits. 

Appeasing Moscow by encouraging Zelensky to cede territory Russia has illegally acquired will only signal that premodern conquest is the pressure point of the West and, therefore, an effective strategy going forward. This applies to Putin as well as all the world’s aspiring imperialists, a frightening notion considering the various incendiary geopolitical flashpoints (i.e. China and Taiwan, Korea, Kashmir, Israel-Palestine, Western Sahara, and Yemen just to name a few). 

Appeasement is a policy long tried with Putin that has only facilitated more trouble. Russia squandered the US-sponsored Partnership for Peace, an attempt to integrate Moscow into the liberal international order and potentially even NATO, by doubling down on its domestic political repression and helping bolster sworn enemies of the West. They proceeded to blow off President Bush’s attempts at bilateral reconciliation by invading neighboring Georgia in 2008. Rather than retaliate, President Obama opted to take a softer line, downplaying Putin’s threat to international security and resuming diplomatic relations via the Russian Reset policy. The Kremlin repaid Washington for these efforts by completely blindsiding them with a formal military annexation of Crimea in 2014. Long story short, every attempt to play ball with Putin and forgive his jingoistic foreign policy endeavors has resulted in him spitting in the face of the West and ramping up his international aggression. Why should this time be any different? 

The ultimate mic drop employed by nearly every supporter of an immediate diplomatic settlement between Russia and Ukraine involves nuclear weapons. What if Putin nukes Ukraine? Is prolonging the war worth risking nuclear armageddon? These are serious, commonly asked questions. 

There is certainly much ambiguity surrounding whether Russia would, quite literally, go nuclear to expedite its war aims. While the thought of an enemy combatant dangling the nuclear option is daunting to say the least, it isn't exactly unexpected considering it is the only real tool in Russia's geopolitical arsenal. 

At this point in the war however, the likelihood of the Russian bureaucracy allowing its madman head of state to jeopardize the existence of human civilization as we know it simply to preserve his own ego is low. It is not completely naive to believe that sadists like Putin and his oligarchic entourage understand that a foreign military operation is not worth opening the Pandora's Box of nuclear warfare. If they were insane enough to go through with it, it is probable that a tactical nuclear strike would have been authorized earlier on in the war to prevent the excessive humiliation they have already been forced to endure. 

It is not in the interest of even the most depraved in power to render their victory meaningless by risking the existence of their own society. Quite the opposite, in fact. It is much more beneficial for the Russian cause to use their nuclear arsenal as a deterrence and not an actual weapon. The second they use it, that is when they lose their biggest (potentially only) source of leverage. 

There are certainly many errors of judgment on President Zelensky's front regarding  preconditions for negotiation. For one thing, he has recently articulated a new demand before reopening dialogue with the Kremlin; Putin must go. Perceiving Russia as a threat so long as its incumbent president remains in power, this new requirement of regime change appears rather farfetched. Whether it is a binding proposition remains to be seen. However, Zelensky's frustration is certainly understandable. The last thing he and his government ought to endure in addition to a Russian onslaught is bullying from his Western partners. If fruitful negotiations blossom between Moscow and Kiev, this should certainly be welcomed. But it ought to be on Ukraine's terms, not anyone else's. 

Zach Fotiadis is a staff writer for On the Record originally from Miami, Florida. He is currently a junior in the School of Foreign Service studying International Politics with a minor in history.