Tracking evasion: OSINT’s new role in Russia’s Shadow fleet and global energy security

Photo via Reuters

ABIGAIL CAMP: Despite sweeping sanctions in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russian oil exports continue to undermine Western efforts at economic pressure. 

As Brookings reports, record-level sanctions have yet to fully curtail the Kremlin’s wartime revenues, largely due to sophisticated evasion tactics and a shadowy maritime network developed after 2022.

This so-called “Shadow Fleet”— hundreds of tankers set up to bypass sanctions-leverages regulatory loopholes. One primary tactic is “flag-hopping,” a process enabled by “flags of convenience” or open registries, which allow ships to register under foreign jurisdictions regardless of ownership. This year, French naval forces seized a suspected shadow fleet tanker using multiple names and flags, demonstrating growing enforcement efforts in European waters.

The sophistication of shadow fleets is built on the exploitation of maritime law and shipping protocols. By routing oil through third-party ports and orchestrating ship-to-ship transfers, Russian interests effectively obscure the true origins of their cargo. Such transfers often occur in international waters where enforcement is more difficult, further complicating efforts by the European Union, the United States and others to intercept or track illicit shipments.

The U.S. Naval Institute and experts at the Institute for Financial Integrity have detailed these evolving tactics, which now include deliberate manipulation of maritime identification systems and navigation data.

Sanction enforcers also contend with clandestine practices such as “going dark,” where vessels disable their automatic identification systems (AIS) or falsify positioning data. Such tactics have made basic monitoring efforts unreliable; even when AIS is active, ships may send false signals. The result is a high volume of flawed data that presents serious challenges for maritime authorities hoping to act decisively.

Emerging open-source intelligence (OSINT) technologies have provided some hope for law enforcement bodies. Databases such as Equasis and OpenSanctions enable agencies to rapidly cross-reference vessel operators, registration histories and sanction lists. Satellite imagery platforms, notably Sentinel-1 SAR analyzed through tools such as Copernicus Open Access Hub and Google Earth, can uncover patterns of unusual loitering, clustering near known transfer hubs and repeated flag changes that point to suspicious oil. 

Experts agree, however, that successfully identifying and acting on shadow fleet activity requires integration of multiple OSINT streams and substantial upgrades to data analysis capabilities. Artificial intelligence is increasingly being deployed to sift through maritime data and flag anomalies that require deeper investigation.

Russia’s growing reliance on shadow fleets not only threatens to undermine the efficacy of Western sanctions but also sets a precedent for other states targeted by international embargoes. According to analysts at Brookings and the U.S. Naval Institute, these developments could shift global energy markets and sharpen divisions between sanctioning powers and major oil traders, raising the risk for future economic and diplomatic confrontations.

The EU and the U.S. have responded not only with new enforcement regimes but also with calls for tighter international cooperation around shipping law and digital maritime surveillance. In addition to conventional deterrents, policymakers are considering collective frameworks to address critical technology gaps and harmonize information sharing across jurisdictions.

As shadow fleet oil tradecraft grows more sophisticated, the battle between enforcement and evasion is escalating. Success will increasingly depend on multidisciplinary approaches, including coordinating intelligence, technology and international legal reform, to address the challenges of an evolving, deeply networked sanctions environment.

The future of global economic security may hinge on how effectively the world’s policymakers and technologists confront the most sophisticated illegal networks that span the world’s oceans.

Abigail Camp is a sophomore in the SFS from San Francisco, California, studying IPOL.