Swiss Neutrality and the Russian-Ukraine War
ZOEY ZHANG: Switzerland has long been a neutral country on the world stage. Perceiving its neighboring countries as enemies rather than allies, Switzerland has a comprehensive military defense system to isolate itself in the heartland of Europe. However, with the unfolding of the Russia-Ukraine war, the longstanding Swiss neutrality seems challenged. On 28 February 2022, the Swiss Federal Council decided to adopt the sanctions imposed by the EU on Russia on 23 and 25 February. This controversial move again sparks the historical discussion of the “neutrality trap” in Switzerland; namely, the dilemma Switzerland faces between the favorable European collective security environment and its permanent state of neutrality. However, before arguing that Switzerland has breached its principle of neutrality by adopting the EU’s sanction packages against Russia, one needs to define neutrality in international relations and in the context of Switzerland. What does it mean to stay neutral for Switzerland? Do what the sanction packages entail violate Switzerland’s principles of neutrality? Most importantly, why did Switzerland do what it did?
The current state of Swiss neutrality can be traced back to the 1815 Congress of Vienna when Swiss neutrality was formally recognized by other European countries. Since then, Switzerland has applied “deliberate, permanent, and armed neutrality” codified in the Swiss Federal Constitution, with Articles 173 and 185 stipulating that “the Federal Assembly and the Federal Council must take the necessary measures to preserve the external security, independence, and neutrality of Switzerland.” Hence, Swiss Neutrality has long exhibited flexibility in its interpretation. During WWI, Switzerland pursued “differential neutrality”, meaning it would only impose economic sanctions, instead of military sanctions, on belligerent countries. However, it returned to “integral neutrality” when Italy invaded Ethiopia as the economic sanctions imposed on Italy impacted Switzerland’s Southern Canton Ticino negatively.
More recently, there has been another shift in perspective of Swiss neutrality, as evidenced by the decision of the Swiss Federal Council on 28 February 2022 to adopt the EU’s goods and financial sanctions against Russia. These include the immediate freezing of the assets of agents listed in the annex to the ordinance as well as the ban on new businesses. Financial sanctions against Russian leaders such as Russian president Vladimir Putin and Russian Prime Minister Sergey Lavrov were also in place. The ban on trade and investment has been extended to the previously Ukranian region, Donetsk and Luhansk, which have been taken over by Russia.
Anticipating dubious public responses, in May 2022, Swiss Foreign Minister Ignazio Cassis coined the phrase “cooperative neutrality” at the World Economic Forum, alluding to Switzerland’s decision to adopt the EU’s sanctions against Russia.
Now let’s take a closer look at why Switzerland was willing to challenge its image as a neutrality keeper. Economic dependency on the EU and Russia definitely plays a vital part in the decision. A measurement of the economic dependency of EU countries on Russia using data from 2013 reveals that geographical proximity with Russia is positively correlated to economic dependency on Russia. Major contributors to the EU economy such as the United Kingdom and France depended relatively less on trade with Russia — their trade with Russia only accounted for 0.8% and 0.9% of their respective GDPs. Italy and Germany are more dependent economically on Russia, with 2% and 2.6% of their respective GDPs deriving from trade with Russia. Among the most dependent EU countries are those Eastern European member states, including Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, all of whom derived at least 15% of their GDP from trade with Russia. Since Switzerland was not an EU country, it was not included in the measurement. However, we can reasonably conclude, based on the geographical proximity of Switzerland to Italy and Germany, Switzerland has a noticeable economic interdependence with Russia.
A closer examination of the economic sanctions that Switzerland adopted reveals the potentially minimal negative impact on the Swiss economy. Among the original 9.7 billion Swiss francs worth of Russian assets frozen in Switzerland in Early April of 2022, around 3.4 billion francs have been provisionally released. Government official Erwin Bollinger lately also pointed to 2.2 billion francs fewer funds newly frozen than released. The transient nature of the freezing of Russian assets indicates the hesitancy of the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), as Bollinger, a senior official at SECO stated “We can't freeze funds if we do not have sufficient grounds". Obviously, even given the EU’s economic sanction package, there was room for internal policy adjustment in Switzerland when it comes to the disposition of foreign financial assets.
Just like other EU countries, Switzerland also strived for being a global advocate for democracy and peace, thus explaining why it adopted the EU economic sanction packages. A direct quote from the Swiss Federal Council’s website shows Switzerland’s deciding reason for adopting such a sanction package – to condemn Russia’s inhumane military attack on Ukraine.
“Russia's unprecedented military attack on a sovereign European country was the deciding factor in the Federal Council's decision to change its previous stance on sanctions. The defense of peace and security and respect for international law are values that Switzerland, as a democratic country, shares with its European neighbors and supports. As before, Switzerland will examine each further package of sanctions imposed by the EU on a case-by-case basis.”
It can also be inferred from Switzerland’s “conditional sanction” what its view of its “neutrality” is. Apparently, it is not non-interference, as the 1993 “Report on Neutrality” clearly stated:
“ the changing nature of the international environment since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the impact on Swiss neutrality policy: The defense of our country’s interests in foreign policy calls for an active position of global solidarity… Openness [includes] participation [in] measures against the new forms of threats and to the setting-up of solid security structures. Continuity is refusing to precipitately abandon security mechanisms [that] have given complete satisfaction. Such a strategy of solidarity and participation combined with our own efforts of defense in the limits of our permanent neutrality meet [the] legitimate security needs of a small state. It reflects at the same time our [commitment to] self-determination and our understanding of the fact that our destiny is inextricably linked with the European continent.”
Switzerland sees its neutrality as open to participation in measures against threats and open to building security. The admittance of its interconnected fate with the European continent further justifies its newly coined term “cooperative neutrality”-- Switzerland is cooperating economically with the EU to restore the security mechanism of Ukraine, whereas at the same time committing to its self-determination as a small state. Nevertheless, it is also worth noting that clearly defining “neutrality” has never been on the main agenda of the Swiss state. Oftentimes it has been comprehended as a tool of its foreign and security policy to suit its own interests.
With the emergence of new global security challenges, the definition of neutrality in Switzerland will be more hotly debated than ever. Therefore, identifying the core of Swiss neutrality is critical. According to a recent report by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, the distinction between neutrality law and neutrality policy has been clearly defined. Under the neutrality law, Switzerland could not militarily favor any country; however, the usage of the neutrality policy is at the discretion of the Swiss government. Moreover, Switzerland is not obliged to remain a neutral country under international law. Should Switzerland wish to cooperate with NATO, Switzerland can choose to rescind its status as a neutral state. Amidst the uncertainties, a domestic survey revealed that over 90 percent of the Swiss population believes that Switzerland’s mediating role is critical to its neutrality and that the majority of the population thinks that Swiss neutrality would prevent the country from being dragged into international conflicts. Therefore, how Switzerland will go about its direction of neutrality, though obscured by the Russia-Ukraine war, still has a positive outlook.
Zoey Zhang is a third-year Political Economy student at the Georgetown College of Arts and Sciences; she is interested in the intersection of Political Science, Economics, Philosophy, and technology.